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Application security

AWS Application Security

Build protection around the AWS services your application depends on.

Review identity, storage, network exposure, secrets and logging against the way your application is actually built and operated.

Tell us what you run. We'll help define the next step.

Engineer working beside data centre racks representing cloud workloads and managed services

What we focus on

  • Identity, roles and permission boundaries
  • Storage, network exposure and secrets
  • Logging, deployment and change ownership
  • Scoped to your environment
  • Clear deliverables, agreed upfront
  • No account needed to enquire
Service overview

AWS Application Security Services

On AWS, most application risk is decided by configuration rather than code. Identity policies determine what a compromised workload can reach, storage permissions decide what is exposed, network rules define what is reachable from the internet, and logging determines whether an incident could be reconstructed at all. These decisions accumulate quietly as an environment grows.

Our AWS application security service is for organisations running customer-facing applications on EC2, ECS, EKS, Lambda and managed AWS services. We help teams map the accounts and workloads behind an application, review IAM roles and privilege escalation paths, find storage and network exposure, assess secrets handling and logging coverage, and examine the deployment pipelines that can change production. The output is a prioritised set of actions tied to application risk rather than an undifferentiated findings export.

Service details

AWS application security across the services your product depends on

An AWS estate accumulates decisions. A role widened to unblock a deployment, a bucket policy loosened for a partner, a security group opened for a test and never closed: each was reasonable on the day, and together they define what an attacker could reach and what you could reconstruct afterwards.

MaxMindSecurity helps businesses plan AWS application security review, IAM and permission analysis, S3 and storage exposure assessment, network and security group review, secrets management, logging design and secure deployment practice. The focus is the application risk created by cloud decisions, not a generic account audit.

The recurring findings are consistent across environments: roles far broader than the workload needs, storage that is public or readable by more principals than expected, long-lived access keys, secrets in environment variables or source control, and logging that is enabled but never reviewed.

Application source code on screen during a cloud security configuration review

Best fit for

  • Applications hosted on EC2, ECS, EKS, Lambda or managed AWS services
  • Teams uncertain about IAM, storage exposure or public endpoints
  • Businesses preparing for launch, audit or a cloud security improvement

What you receive

  • An application-focused exposure and dependency review
  • Identity, storage, network and logging recommendations
  • Prioritised actions tied to real application risk
Protection model

AWS application security areas we help you plan

Cloud security work is most useful when it is anchored to an application. Rather than producing a long list of account findings, we start from what your product does and follow the permissions, data and network paths it actually relies on.

Identity, roles and permission boundaries

IAM is where most AWS incidents are decided. We review the roles used by workloads, humans and pipelines, looking for wildcard actions, broad resource scopes, unused permissions, long-lived access keys and roles that can escalate to something more privileged. Where possible we recommend workload identity over static credentials, and permission boundaries or service control policies that make an over-permissive role less useful to an attacker.

Data storage, network exposure and secrets

We review S3 buckets, databases, snapshots and backups for public access, over-broad policies and encryption gaps, then map which are genuinely reachable from the internet and which sit behind an application. Security groups, load balancers, public subnets and exposed management endpoints are checked alongside secrets handling, since credentials in environment variables, task definitions or source control undermine otherwise sound controls.

Logging, deployment and change ownership

Logging determines whether an incident can be understood. We review CloudTrail coverage, log retention and protection, and whether anyone reviews what is collected. Deployment paths get the same attention: which pipeline can change production, what permissions it holds, whether changes are reviewed, and how a bad change is rolled back. A pipeline with administrative rights is an application risk, not just a DevOps concern.

What we review

A focused AWS scope tied to the application.

Before reviewing configuration, we agree which application, accounts and environments are in scope, and what access is available for the work.

Application, accounts and environments

We identify the AWS accounts and environments that support the application, the managed services it depends on, the public endpoints it exposes and the teams responsible for each. Multi-account estates are common, so we agree which boundaries are in scope rather than assuming the whole organisation is included.

Access, evidence and review method

We agree how the review is carried out: read-only access for configuration review, exported evidence, or a workshop-based approach where access cannot be granted. This determines the depth of the findings, so it is settled at proposal stage rather than discovered midway.

Priorities, constraints and change ownership

We confirm the concerns behind the request, whether an audit, launch or incident is driving it, and any constraints such as change freezes or shared responsibility with a managed hosting provider. Findings are then prioritised against the application risk and who is able to act on them.

Scope and quote

Start with the right scope.

Tell us which application is in scope, which AWS accounts and services it uses, and what is driving the request. We will confirm the proposed scope, access requirements, deliverables, availability and pricing before work begins.

What an AWS security engagement can include

  • Application, account and public exposure inventory
  • IAM role, policy and privilege escalation review
  • Storage, database, snapshot and backup exposure assessment
  • Network, security group and management endpoint review
  • Secrets handling and credential rotation recommendations
  • Logging, retention and monitoring coverage review
  • Deployment pipeline permission and change control guidance
  • Prioritised findings with owners and remediation sequence

Request a quote for aws application security

Share the systems involved, your priorities and the tools you already use. We reply by email with the scope, availability and pricing once we have reviewed what you send.

No account or payment needed. Please do not include passwords or access keys.
CLOUD REVIEW

AWS findings your team can act on in a sensible order.

We move from application mapping to prioritised remediation in stages, so the output is a short list of things that matter rather than an undifferentiated export.

  1. 01

    Scope and access

    We agree the application, accounts, environments and review method, along with the access or evidence needed to carry out the work.

  2. 02

    Configuration review

    Identity, storage, network, secrets, logging and deployment configuration are reviewed against the way the application is built and operated.

  3. 03

    Risk prioritisation

    Findings are assessed for real exploitability and business impact, then ordered so the highest-value fixes are clear rather than buried.

  4. 04

    Remediation handoff

    We document findings, recommended changes, owners and sequencing, and confirm what should be re-checked after remediation.

Frequently asked questions

Questions teams ask before an AWS security review.

Cloud reviews are only useful if they end with decisions. These answers explain how we keep the scope tied to your application and the findings actionable.

Do you need access to our AWS accounts?

Read-only access gives the most accurate results, and it is the usual approach. Where that is not possible we can work from exported configuration evidence or run a workshop-based review, which covers less ground in less depth. The method is agreed in the proposal so expectations about depth are set before work begins.

Is this the same as running a cloud security scanning tool?

No. Automated tools are useful for coverage and we may use their output as input, but they produce long lists without knowing what your application does. The value here is context: which findings are genuinely reachable, which matter to your business, and which order to fix them in.

Can you fix the findings as well as report them?

Often, yes, though it is scoped separately because it needs change authority, testing and rollback planning. Many teams prefer to remediate internally using the prioritised findings, with us reviewing the result. The proposal will state whether the engagement covers review, remediation support or both.

We use a managed hosting partner. Does that change things?

It changes who can act. Part of the scoping conversation is establishing the shared responsibility boundary: which controls your partner owns, which you own and where authority for changes sits. Findings are then directed at whoever is actually able to resolve them.

How does this relate to the AWS Well-Architected security pillar?

It covers similar ground but is anchored to a specific application rather than a whole-environment framework review. Where a Well-Architected review has already been completed, we can use it as input and focus on the application-level exposure, identity and data paths in more depth.

Can you review an AWS Organization with multiple accounts?

Yes. We map the accounts, workloads and public exposure in scope before starting, and confirm whether the review covers a single account, a subset, or the wider organisation including cross-account roles and shared services. The proposal reflects the number of accounts and the access available.

Need a specific answer? Talk to our team

Further reading: AWS Well-Architected Framework, security pillar